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INSURANCE
W. Shelby McKenzie and
H. Alston Johnson*
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

Applicability of the Uninsured Motorist (UM) Statute
Prior to its amendments in 1987 and 1988, Louisiana Revised Statutes
22:1406(D)(1)(a)(i) had required uninsured motorist coverage as an adjunct to any automobile liability insurance policy that was "delivered
or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle
registered or principally garaged in this state." A conflict had developed
among the courts of appeal concerning whether the mandatory provisions
of this UM statute were applicable when the accident occurred in Louisiana and the policy was issued and delivered in another state on a
vehicle registered and principally garaged in that state.' In Snider v.
Murray,2 the supreme court resolved this conflict. The insurance policy
in the Snider case had been delivered in Texas and listed a vehicle that
was principally garaged in Texas at the time of delivery. The insured,
Snider, had a Texas domicile when he procured the insurance policy.
According to the court, the statute, by its express terms, mandated UM
coverage only for automobile liability policies "delivered or issued for
delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or
principally garaged in this state." Therefore, the court concluded, even
though the accident occurred in Louisiana and only Louisiana domiciliaries were involved, the Louisiana statute did not mandate UM coverage
by the out-of-state policy. 3
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*

Adjunct Professors of Law, Louisiana State University; Members, Louisiana State

Bar Association.
1. See, e.g., Wilson v. State Farm Ins. Co., 448 So. 2d 1379 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1984) (Louisiana law applied to a policy issued and delivered in Texas, which was to
cover a vehicle registered in Texas, where action was brought by a Louisiana victim and
the accident occurred in Louisiana); Richard v. Beacon Nat'l Ins. Co., 442 So. 2d 875
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (Texas law applied to a policy issued and delivered in Texas);
Abel v. White, 430 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (Louisiana law did not apply
to a policy issued in Texas to Texas residents on vehicles principally garaged in Texas).
2.

461 So. 2d 1051 (La. 1985).

3. As the Snider court noted, the language of the UM statute setting out its scope
is somewhat similar to the scope language of the Direct Action Statute, which applies
when: (i) the policy was issued or delivered in Louisiana; or (ii) when the accident or
injury occurred in Louisiana regardless of the state of the policy's delivery. See La. R.S.
22:655 (1978); Snider, 461 So. 2d at 1054 n.4.
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During the last year, the Louisiana Supreme Court once again turned
its attention to the applicability of the UM statute to policies issued
and delivered in another state. In Roger v. Estate of Moulton,4 the
insurance policy in question was issued and delivered to a national firm
in another state. The policy provided liability coverage for the vehicle,
which the firm had registered and principally garaged in Louisiana, but
no UM coverage. The court held that the Louisiana UM statute applied
to any vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state regardless
of where the policy had been issued or delivered.' Thus, the court
concluded, the insurer was required to provide UM coverage on a
Louisiana vehicle in conformity with the statute even though the insurance policy was issued and delivered in another state.
By Act 444 of 1987, the legislature extended the coverage of the
UM statute. The Act adds language to provide that the UM statute
should apply not only as previously provided but also "as provided in
this Sub-paragraph." The new subparagraph (iii) reads as follows:
(iii) This Sub-paragraph and its requirement for uninsured motorist coverage shall apply to any liability insurance covering
any accident which occurs in this state and involves a resident
6
of this state.
The apparent purpose of this legislation is to make the coverage mandated by the UM statute available in cases like Snider, where the policy
is issued out-of-state on an out-of-state vehicle and the accident occurs
in Louisiana and involves a Louisiana resident. The imprecise language
in the amendment, which may be vulnerable to constitutional challenge,
is certain to spawn considerable litigation. 7 Can the Louisiana statute,
which seems to regulate the issuance of automobile insurance, define
the mandatory terms of an insurance policy on a vehicle whose only
relationship with the state of Louisiana at the time of issuance of the
policy is the possibility that the vehicle may be driven in the state during
the policy term? What is meant by an accident that "involves a resident
of this state?" Must the owner of the insured auto be a resident or
will it suffice that any operator or even that any UM claimant is a

4. 513 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1987).
5. The court justified its decision with "the vital interest Louisiana has in the
application of the UM statute as a matter of public policy." Id. at 1130-31. Cf. Courville
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 703, 705-06 (La. 1981).
6. La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1988) (as amended by 1987 La. Acts. No.

444, § 1).
7. The principal attraction of the Louisiana statute appears to be its more generous
requirement of underinsured motorist protection. In most states, underinsured motorist
coverage is available only to the extent that the UM limits of liability exceed the tortfeasor's
liability limits. The entire UM limits are available to the Louisiana insured in addition
to the tortfeasor's liability coverage. La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(b) (1978).
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resident? Does the amendment intend to mandate coverage only for
resident claimants?
While the legislature expanded the circumstances under which UM
coverage is mandated, it restricted the types of vehicles to which the
coverage requirements apply. Prior to Act 203 of 1988, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(i) required that UM coverage be-provided on
"any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state." Act
203 limited the requirement to "any motor vehicle designed for use on
public highways and required to be registered in this state." Therefore,
the statute now mandates UM coverage only for motor vehicles that
both are designed for use on public highways and must be registered.'
The statute uses the term "motor vehicle" in two contexts. First,
the statute describes the insured motor vehicle for which the insurer
must provide uninsured motorist coverage. Second, it refers to the
uninsured motor vehicle, whose owner or operator is liable to the insured.
Does the amendment's limitation of the definition of the insured motor
vehicle likewise affect the definition of uninsured motor vehicles? As
originally enacted, the statute did not define the term "motor vehicle"
for either purpose. 9 Now that the legislature has provided some content
to the term as it is used in the first context, one can reasonably argue
that the same content was intended for the term as it is used in the
second context.
As a general rule, courts have not enforced insurance policy provisions that purport to limit UM coverage.' 0 In Act 233 of 1988, the
legislature expressly sanctioned one particular type of limitation. Apparently to permit an exception to this general rule, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iv), added by that Act, provides that the insurer
and insured may limit uninsured motorist coverage on a school bus to
"an accident or incident involving the school bus.""

8. La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(l)(a)(i), as amended by 1988 La. Acts No. 203, reads: "[W]ith
respect to any motor vehicle designed for use on public highways and required to be
(emphasis added).
registered in this state or as provided in this Sub-paragraph....
Presumably, the extension of coverage under section 1406(D)(l)(a)(iii), quoted above in
the text, is limited to vehicles designed for use on public highways and subject to registration
since the "requirement for uninsured motorist coverage" under subparagraph (i) is now
only applicable to motor vehicles which meet that description.
9. This ambiguity led to the suggestion that UM coverage might be triggered by
negligence arising out of the use of a non-highway motor vehicle. See Posey v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 332 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); cf. Hidalgo v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 374 So. 2d 1261 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Crowe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 416 So. 2d 1376 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
10. See Fisher v. Morrison, 519 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
11. 1988 La. Acts No. 233, § 1.
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Waiver of Coverage
The UM statute permits the insured to reject coverage entirely or
to select lower coverage limits. 12 Prior to the 1987 legislation, the supreme
court had indicated that an unequivocal, written expression of rejection
is necessary for an effective waiver of coverage. 3 Through the passage
of Act 436 of 1987, the legislature further delineated the formal requirements for waiver of coverage:
[R]ejection or selection of lower limits shall be made only on
a form designated by each insurer. The form shall be provided
by the insurer and signed by the named insured or his legal
representative. 14
During the most recent regular legislative session, the legislature
made another clarification in the waiver provisions of the UM statute.
Before its amendment, Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(i)
provided as follows:
Such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a
renewal or substitute policy where the named insured has rejected
the coverage or selected lower limits in connection with a policy
previously issued to him by the same insurer. 5
Act 203 of 1988 expanded the circumstances under which the execution
of a new waiver is not necessary. As amended, the section's exemption
extends to "a renewal, reinstatement, or substitute policy . . . issued to
' 6
him by the same insurer or any of its affiliates."'
Amount of Coverage
Prior to 1988 legislation, Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(b)
required an insurer to permit the insured, at his written request, to
increase his UM coverage "to any amount." Act 203 of 1988 imposes
a limit on the insured's right to request additional coverage. Now the
insured may obtain coverage up "to any available limit up to the bodily
' 7
injury liability coverage limits afforded under the policy.'
Stacking of Multiple Coverages
During the past session, the legislature restricted the exception to
the anti-stacking rule found in Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(c).

12. La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988).
13. Giroir v. Theriot, 513 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (La. 1987); Roger v. Estate of Moulton,
513 So. 2d 1126, 1131 (La. 1987).
14. La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1988).
15. La. R.S. 22:1406(D)()(a)(i) (1978).
16. 1988 La. Acts No. 203, § I (emphasis added).
17.

Id.
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Prior to the amendment, the statute permitted any party "injured ...
while occupying an automobile not owned by said injured party" to
obtain coverage under more than one policy. Family members of the
owner were allowed to take advantage of the limited stacking permitted
by the statute even though the owner himself could not.' 8 Act 203 of
1988, however, permits such stacking only "when the injured party
occup[ies] an automobile not owned by said injured party, resident
spouse, or resident relative."'19 The amendment apparently places the
vehicle owner and those family members who reside with him in the
same position, limiting all of them to one coverage.
Right to Select Policy
A person injured while occupying an automobile that he owns also
may be an insured under other policies that he or a resident spouse or
relative purchased on other vehicles. There was a conflict in the jurisprudence whether a person occupying an insured automobile must accept
the coverage on that vehicle or whether he could select another, more
favorable policy. In Branch v. O'Brien,20 the plaintiff owned four vehicles, each of which was insured under a separate State Farm policy.
Three of the policies, including the one on the vehicle in which the
plaintiff was riding when she was injured by an uninsured motorist,
had UM limits of $10,000. The other policy, however, had UM limits
of $100,000. Although the UM statute clearly prohibited recovery under
all the policies, it did not specify which policy was available to the
plaintiff. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal permitted the
plaintiff to elect the policy under which she would collect, and she quite
naturally chose the $100,000 policy.
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal reached a different
result in Breaux v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.2 ' The
plaintiff, while operating his motorcycle, was injured by an uninsured
motorist. While the policy on the motorcycle provided UM coverage of
up to $10,000, that on the plaintiff's automobile provided UM coverage
of up to $50,000. The court held that the plaintiff, who was limited
by statute to one policy only, had to accept the coverage available under
the motorcycle policy and could not select the more favorable automobile
policy.

18. Courville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 703 (La. 1981); Worsham
v. Walker, 498 So. 2d 260 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986), writ denied, 500 So. 2d 423, 424
(1987).
19. 1988 La. Acts No. 203 (emphasis added).
20. 396 So. 2d 1372 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 400 So. 2d 905 (1981).
21. 413 So. 2d 988 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 453 (1982).
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In Wyatt v. Robin, 22 the supreme court resolved the conflict in favor
of the right of selection, accepting the view of the second circuit. Wyatt
was injured by an underinsured motorist. He had obtained UM coverage
through a policy issued on his vehicle. Wyatt, however, resided with
his parents and was therefore also an insured under their automobile
insurance policies, which provided significantly higher UM coverage
limits. The supreme court held that Wyatt was not relegated to his own
policy but rather was free to select one of his parents' more favorable
UM policies. 2
Perhaps in response to Wyatt, the legislature passed Act 203 of
1988, which amends Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(e). That
statute now reads:
(e) The uninsured motorist coverage does not apply to bodily
injury, sickness, or disease, including death of an insured resulting therefrom, while occupying a motor vehicle owned by
the insured if such motor vehicle is not described in the policy
under which a claim is made, or is not a newly acquired or
24
replacement motor vehicle covered under the terms of the policy.
The new subparagraph thus provides that when an insured suffers
bodily injury while occupying a certain motor vehicle that he owns, he
may not demand payment under any policy that does not specifically
cover that vehicle. 25 Apparently, the purpose of the amendment was to
cripple the right of selection recognized in Wyatt. In cases like Wyatt
and Branch, in which the insured suffers injury while occupying an
automobile owned by him, subparagraph (e) would permit recovery only
under the particular policy issued on that automobile.
Limits of Liability
The UM coverage clause of an automobile insurance policy often
includes a "per person" limit of liability, which represents the maximum
recovery available for "bodily injury to one person." In Carrollv. State
Farm Insurance Co.,26 the court correctly applied this limitation to a

22. 518 So. 2d 594 (La. 1988).
23. The court also held that Wyatt's acceptance of the tender of its UM limits from
his own insurer did not bar pursuit of his parents' insurers so long as his ultimate recovery
did not exceed the UM limits of the most favorable policy. See Taylor v. Tanner, 442
So. 2d 435 (La. 1983).
24. 1988 La. Acts No. 203, § 1.
25. Previously, the courts had refused to enforce similar exclusions contained in
insurance policies on the ground such limitation of coverage conflicted with the UM
coverage mandated by statute. See, e.g., Thomas v. Nelson, 295 So. 2d 847 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 299 So. 2d 791 (1974).
26. 519 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 520 So. 2d 756 (1988).
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claim for loss of consortium. The wife was injured by an uninsured
motorist. The husband, who was not involved in the automobile accident,
allegedly suffered loss of consortium. According to the court, the hus-

band's claim was not for a separate and distinct "bodily injury"; instead,
his claim arose out of, and was therefore an extension of, the wife's
bodily injury. Since there was bodily injury to only one person, the
court reasoned a single "per person" limit governed both the wife's

claim for personal injuries and the husband's claim for loss of consortium. The court therefore concluded that the sum of the amount

recovered by the husband and the amount recovered by the wife could
27
not exceed that single "per person" limit.
Subrogation
For some time now it has been well-settled that a UM insurer may
not use "consent-to-settle" and subrogation provisions in the policy to

prevent the insured from settling with the tortfeasor and his liability
insurer.2" A fifth circuit decision, Moncrief v. Panepinto,29 raised doubt
whether the insured's release of the tortfeasor precluded a subsequent

claim by the UM insurer against the tortfeasor for recovery of the
amount it had paid the insured under UM coverage. This doubt was
dispelled in Bosch v. Cummings.3 0 The supreme court, reasoning that
the UM insurer has no independent right of recovery against the tort-

feasor, concluded that the insurer can acquire against the tortfeasor only
those rights that are authorized by the general Civil Code provisions
governing subrogation. 3' According to the court, if the insured releases

the tortfeasor before payment by the UM insurer, no claim remains to
which the UM insurer may be subrogated.

Penalties
In Cantrelle Fence & Supply Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,32 the
insured parties, after successfully suing their UM insurer for benefits

27. Cf. Albin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 498 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 498 So. 2d 1088 (1986), which suggests that loss of consortium may
not be "bodily injury" within the meaning of the insurance policy. Carroll presents the
more appropriate analysis, recognizing that it is the bodily injury of the spouse that
triggers coverage for loss of consortium subject to the single "per person" limit for the
combined claims of both spouses.
28. Neimann v. Travelers Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 1003 (La. 1979).
29. 489 So. 2d 938 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
30. 520 So. 2d 721 (La. 1988). See also Pace v. Cage, 419 So. 2d 443 (La. 1982).
31. Bond v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 407 So. 2d 401 (La. 1981). Bosch
further points out that if the UM insurer reimburses the insured for only a portion of
his damages, the UM insurer receives only a partial, subordinate subrogation. 520 So. 2d
at 723.
32. 515 So. 2d 1074 (La. 1987).
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under the policy, filed a separate suit against the insurer to recover
penalties and attorneys fees under Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658.
The insurer countered with the argument that by failing to bring the
suit based on section 658 at the same time as the suit on the policy,
the plaintiff forfeited the right of action under section 658. This argument
relied on Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 425, which prohibits
separate suits on parts of an obligation. Holding that the claim under
section 658 was a separate cause of action from the claim for UM
benefits, the supreme court concluded that the trial court erred in
maintaining the insurer's exception of improper division of an obligation.
DIRECT ACTION

STATUTE

The 1988 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature produced an
interesting change in the Direct Action Statute.33 As originally drafted,
the proposed amendment was a part of the governor's tort and insurance
reform package, but it was subjected to substantial amendment during
the legislative process. Consequently, the amendment's potential for
dramatically altering the application of the statute is probably quite
limited.
As finally enacted, the act a4 does not change the law with respect
to the naming of a liability insurer as a direct defendant in a personal
injury action. Thus, an injured plaintiff may still include the wrongdoer's
liability insurer as a defendant in an action to recover for his injuries.
The act does require, however, that the insured be named as a defendant
whenever the insurer is so named, except in five specific instances: (1)
when the insured has been adjudged a bankrupt, or bankruptcy proceedings have been commenced properly against him; (2) when the
insured is insolvent; (3) when the insured cannot be served; (4) when
the action is for damages resulting from an offense or quasi-offense
and the suit is between a child and his parent or between married
persons; and (5) when the insurer is an uninsured motorist carrier."
The practical effect of this amendment is difficult to gauge. It will
require at least the formality of a suit against the alleged wrongdoer
by name, whereas the prior statute would have permitted suit against
the wrongdoer's liability carrier without the necessity of naming the
insured himself. Whether the new requirement will actually deter potential
litigation remains to be seen, but it seems unlikely. This amendment,

33. La. R.S. 22:655 (1978).
34. 1988 La. Acts No. 934.
35. This last exception is incongruous. An uninsured motorist carrier is not a liability
carrier, and its obligation to its insured is a matter of contract, not tort. A suit against
such a carrier by its own insured, for the first-party coverage offered by such insurance,
would never have been governed by the Direct Action Statute in any event.
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which represents only a partial solution to the problems that exist under
the Direct Action Statute, may prove to be more a nuisance than anything
else. Undoubtedly it would be better for the legislature to resolve once
and for all the fundamental question raised by the present practice:
should personal injury litigation be conducted between the injured party
and the alleged wrongdoer, or between the injured party and the wrong36
doer's insurer?
INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Shortly after the passage of the "modern" Louisiana version of
punitive damages in 1984, 1 academic debate began on the subject of
the insurability of such damages. The legislature, characteristically silent
on the question, apparently was content to leave the matter to be thrashed
out in individual cases.
Given the distinct flavoring that the Direct Action Statute and its
jurisprudential progeny give to Louisiana law, the authors entertained
very little doubt that the judiciary would ultimately resolve the issue in
favor of insurability. Whether the courts would in fact reach that result
remained an open question for some time after passage of the articles.
The answer to this question, however, is rapidly becoming settled.
Some initial district court opinions indicated that insuring against punitive
damages does not violate Louisiana public policy.3 8 Then during this

36. In the new Louisiana Code of Evidence, the legislature appears to have expressed
itself as generally opposed to the communication of the policy limits to the jury, which
may be taken as an indication that it leans toward the former alternative. La. Code Evid.
art. 412, enacted by 1988 La. Acts No. 515, provides: "Although a policy of insurance
may be admissible, the amount of coverage under the policy shall not be communicated
to the jury unless the amount of coverage is a disputed issue which the jury will decide."
37. Contrary to popular belief, Louisiana did recognize punitive damages in its early
jurisprudence. See Bentley v. Fischer Lumber & Mfg. Co., 51 La. Ann. 451, 25 So. 262
(1899); Burkett v. Lanata, 15 La. Ann. 337 (1860); Grant v. McDonogh, 7 La. Ann. 447
(1852); Summers v. Baumgard, 9 La. 161 (1836). Awards were usually for what we would
now term wrongful seizure. This line of cases comes to a mysterious end about the turn
of the twentieth century. These same cases stand for the proposition that the punitive
damages had to bear some reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages which
were awarded. Another interesting group of cases established the proposition that punitive
damages could not be assessed on the basis of vicarious liability. See Patterson v. New
Orleans & Carrolton R.R. Co., 110 La. 797, 34 So. 782 (1903); Graham v. St. Charles
St. R.R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1656, 18 So. 707 (1895); Hill v. New Orleans, Opelousas &
Great W. R.R. Co., 11 La. Ann. 292 (1856); Keene v. Lizardi, 8 La. 26 (1835).
38. In Levet v. Calais & Sons, 514 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987), it appears
to have been taken for granted by the parties and the trial court that the punitive damages
which were awarded could properly fall within the coverage of the liability insurance
policy. The entire subject of insurability of punitive damages is explored in a recent
student article. See Comment, The Insurability of Punitive Damages in Louisiana, 48 La.
L. Rev. 1161 (1988).
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past year the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal faced the issue
squarely in Creech v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 9 In the Creech case,
the plaintiff grounded his claim for punitive damages on the allegation
that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The
insurer contended that its policy did not cover punitive damages and,
alternatively, that if the policy could be construed to cover such damages,
the coverage would be against Louisiana public policy. The appellate
court disagreed on both counts.
The court found that the policy covered punitive damages, noting
that an insurer which accepts a premium for covering "all liability for
damages" should honor its obligation. 40 In rejecting the insurer's alternative argument, the court was influenced by the legislature's silence on
the point of insurability. It was also influenced by the judiciary's longstanding opinion that the Direct Action Statute establishes a policy in
favor of coverage, for the benefit of both the insured and the victim.
In a special concurrence, Judge Sexton, who joined in the majority
opinion, pointedly urged the legislature either to repeal the punitive
damages statute or to prohibit insurance coverage of such damages. In
his view, insurance coverage negates whatever "punitive" aspect these
damages may have, and instead simply rewards "the victim (and his
41
attorney) beyond the measure of that victim's actual damages."
Obviously, there is much more to be done on this subject after
Creech. The arguments that would support disallowing insurance coverage of punitive damages for DWI-namely, that such damages should
punish the wrongdoer who was actually intoxicated, not all those persons
who buy automobile liability insurance-may not apply with equal vigor
to punitive damages for the transportation, storage, or handling of
hazardous or toxic substances. Though one can argue that there should
be no vicarious liability for any punitive damage award, the contention
seems to have more force in the DWI setting than in the hazardous or
toxic substance setting. For the moment, however, it seems that the
question of the insurability of punitive damages in all contexts is well
on its way to judicial resolution.
LiFE INSURANCE
Familiar problems in the field of life insurance are created by the
delay in issuance of a life insurance policy following application and
payment of an initial premium. These problems arose again recently
within a somewhat unusual factual context in Mauronerv. Massachusetts

39. 516 So. 2d 1168 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So. 2d 128 (1988).
40. Id.at 1174.
41. Id. (Sexton, J.,concurring).
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Indemnity & Life Insurance Co. 42 Through a local agent of the insurer,
the insured and his spouse applied for a $100,000 life insurance policy
on the insured's life, with a $10,000 rider on his spouse's life. The
language of the application, which included a fairly standard "binding
receipt" clause, announced that coverage would be retroactive to the
date of the application once the conditions of the application were met
and the policy issued. The policy also contained a two-year suicide
provision, stating that if the insured should commit suicide within two
years of the date of issuance, the insurer's liability would be limited to
the amount of the premiums paid.
The agent mailed the application on November 6, 1981, along with
the insured's check for one month's premium. Apparently because the
agent erred in choosing the particular mixture of insurance plans that
were to provide the $100,000 coverage with the appropriate rider for
the spouse, the insurer did not act upon the application promptly. Two
weeks after the application was mailed, the insurer wrote to the agent
noting the error and asking for a clarification. Nothing happened until
January 4, 1982, when the agent and the insurer, through a series of
telephone calls, began to determine the source of the problem. The
agent corrected the problem, and the insurer issued the policy ten days
later on February 4, 1982 (though the issuance date stated on the policy
was February 11, 1982). 4 3 The insured committed suicide on January
13, 1984-more than two years after the mailing of the application but
less than two years from the issuance date on the policy. The insurer
refused to pay the proceeds and returned the premiums.
The trial court took a direct approach, simply reforming the issuance
date of the policy, on the basis of the insurer's negligence, to November
6, 1981. Having selected that date as the date of issuance, it was then
an easy matter for the court to find that the suicide occurred more
than two years after the issuance date. The appellate court reached the
same result, but for different reasons. As the appellate court correctly
noted, there is no authority for substituting a different issuance date
because the insurer has, through its negligence, delayed the issuance of
the policy. The court, however, concluded that the insurer's negligence
in delaying the issuance of the policy had caused the beneficiary to lose
the right to the policy proceeds. In its view, if the insurer had not been

42. 520 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 524 So. 2d 518 (1988).
43. According to the opinion, the agent brought the policy to the residence of the
insured and his spouse on February 28, 1982. He allegedly discussed the contents of the
policy with them, including the two-year suicide provision. He also allegedly made the
unfortunate but prophetic statement that the insured could not "blow his brains out"
for at least two years after the issue date in order for the beneficiary to collect the
proceeds. Id.at 453.
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negligent, the policy would have been issued well before the actual
issuance date, and the suicide would have occurred after the expiration
of the two-year period from issuance. Thus, rather than arbitrarily
reforming the policy issuance date to the application date as had the
district court, the appellate court reasoned that so long as the last day
upon which a careful insurer would have issued the policy was more
than two years before the suicide, the plaintiff could recover by showing
a breach of duty and causation.
While the result of Mauroner seems fair in light of the unusually
long delay between application and issuance and considering the policy's
binding receipt clause, one is entitled to ask whether there is any more
authority for the appellate court's choice of an unknown date than there
is for the trial court's substitution of the application date. In defense
of the appellate court, one can at least point to some jurisprudence
that affords substantial remedies to the insured upon a showing of
negligent delay by the insurer." Until this decision, however, the ar4
gument had not enjoyed much success. 1
HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE

Partial Subrogation Under "Reimbursement Clause"
During this term an insurer learned something surprising about the
"reimbursement agreement" called for under its health and accident
policy. In Smith v. Manville Forest Products Corp.," the court held
that such an agreement, which the insurer probably expected would
produce full reimbursement regardless of the amount collected by the
insured from a tortfeasor, instead permits only partial reimbursement
47
as a result of the partial subordinate subrogation rule in the Civil Code.
Plaintiff, an employee of Manville, and his family were members
of the company's employee health care plan. After his wife and son
were injured in an automobile accident, plaintiff submitted a statement
of medical and hospital expenses to the administrator of the plan. A
provision of the plan required the employee to sign a "right of reimbursement agreement" under such circumstances prior to the payment

44.

See, e.g., Woods v. Integon Life Ins. Corp., 507 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 3d Cir.),

writ denied, 512 So. 2d 461 (1987); Antoine v. Sentry Life Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d 768

(La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
45. See, e.g., Brunt v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 259 So. 2d 575 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1972); Duplissey v. Southern United Life Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 540 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 392 So. 2d 1067 (1980); Duke v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co.,

341 So. 2d

1366 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
46. 521 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 522 So. 2d 570 (1988).
47. La. Civ. Code art. 1826.
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of any such expenses. 41 Plaintiff ultimately signed such an agreement,
and the plan administrator paid him for some, but not all, of the
expenses. Plaintiff had already received some funds in a settlement with
the tortfeasor's insurer, and later received additional funds in a settlement
with his own uninsured motorist carrier. When he submitted a statement
for additional medical expenses to the health care plan administrator,
the administrator refused to make payment and demanded a refund of
prior payments. The administrator reasoned that since plaintiff had not
reimbursed the plan for its payment of the expenses, the plan had
already paid more than required. Plaintiff contended that since he had
not received the full amount of his damage in those settlements, he was
not required to reimburse the plan administrator for the entire amount
it had paid on his behalf.
The controversy highlights the difference between a conventional
subrogation clause (called by the court a "pure" subrogation clause)
which arguably would require reimbursement only according to the level
of funds realized by the subrogor through settlement with the tortfeasor;
and the reimbursement clause of the Manville plan, which Manville
thought entitled it to reimbursement from the first dollars received by
the plan participant, regardless of whether the settlement with the tortfeasor fully compensated the participant for his damages. The appellate
court sided with the plaintiff and against Manville, finding that the
agreement was one of conventional subrogation and therefore that it
was subject to the subrogation rules of the Civil Code.
One of those rules, which is now contained in Civil Code article
1826, rests on the premise that subrogation should not operate to the
detriment of the subrogor when he has received only partial payment
from the subrogee. 9 The subrogor retains the right to obtain the balance
of the debt from the obligor, and his right is in preference to the right
of his subrogee. Once the court had determined in this instance that
the "reimbursement agreement" accomplished nothing more than a standard conventional subrogation, the result in this case was inevitable.

48. The provision in question was entitled "Subrogation" and required the plan
participant to "reimburse this Plan . . . immediately upon collection of damages, if any,
whether by legal action, settlement or otherwise." Another portion of the provision
authorized the filing of a lien to protect this right and permitted the plan to intervene
if necessary in the proceedings. Functionally, the court saw the provision as the equivalent
of a conventional subrogation. While the court's interpretation of the provision as a
conventional subrogation is not ineluctable, it is a plausible interpretation given the effect
of the provision.
49. See Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sonnier, 406 So. 2d 178 (La.
1981); Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981 -Obligations, 42 La. L. Rev. 388,
400-02 (1982).
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The Maturing of Cataldie
This term saw a continued trend toward narrowing the rule of
Cataldie v. Louisiana Health Service and Indemnity Co.,SO which has
not proved particularly popular among the appellate courts since its
-nnouncement four years ago. In Cataldie, the supreme court held that
a health and accident policy is deemed to continue when the insurer,
after learning that the insured has been diagnosed with a catastrophic
illness, effectively forces him to cancel his policy by radically reducing
his coverage while substantially increasing his premiums." An appellate
court subsequently extended that ruling to a group policy under somewhat
similar circumstances."
Since that appellate court decision, disappointed insureds have invoked Cataldie in a variety of factual situations, most often without
success. In Mezzacappo v. Travelers Insurance Co.," plaintiff, who was
covered by a group policy issued to her employer, was seriously injured
in an automobile accident in April, 1983. In the fall of that year, her
employer sold the radio station at which she worked to another entity,
and her employment came to an end. Her former employer paid the
last premium for the policy at about the same time. Although she was
entitled under the terms of the group policy to convert to an individual
policy, she did not do so. She was also entitled to reimbursement for
expenses "during the calendar year in which" the coverage terminated
and "during the next calendar year." Under that provision, the insurer
paid the medical expenses arising out of the April, 1983 accident until
December 31, 1984.
Plaintiff, not satisfied with those payments, sued for continuing
reimbursement of the expenses. Citing Cataldie, plaintiff was successful
in the trial court. The appellate court reversed, properly noting that the
insurer had not cancelled the coverage, as the insurer in Cataldie effectively had. Rather, the court concluded, the coverage terminated
according to the terms of the policy, and for that reason, the statute
did not require continuation of the coverage past December 31, 1984.
4
The plaintiffs in Viada v. Blue Cross of Louisiana1
were likewise
unsuccessful in invoking Cataldie, but for much more mundane reasons.
Two policies were involved in Viada. The first was cancelled for the

50. 456 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1984).
51. The court was interpreting La. R.S. 22:213(B)(7) (1978), and in particular the
portion of the statute that provides that any cancellation of an individual policy "shall
be without prejudice to any claim originating prior thereto."
52. Cabibi v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 465 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1985).
53. 523 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
54. 524 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
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plaintiffs' failure to pay the premiums; the second was retroactively
cancelled when the insurer discovered that the plaintiffs had made serious
material misrepresentations in the application. Both the trial court and
the appellate court held that these were legitimate reasons for cancellation
and that Cataldie did not mandate a continuation of coverage under
such circumstances.
PROPERTY

INSURANCE

Legislation
During this past year the most important development in the field
of property insurance was legislative rather than jurisprudential. Act
951, effective when signed by the governor on July 27, 1988, repealed
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:695 in its entirety.15 This statute, known
as the "valued policy statute," required a fire insurer to pay the total
amount for which "any inanimate property, immovable by nature or
destination" was insured if that property was totally destroyed.
This provision of the Insurance Code had always been controversial.
The valued policy concept is the counterpart to a co-insurance clause.
The latter, .which requires an insured to bear a percentage of his own
loss if he does not purchase coverage up to a certain portion of the
value of the property, is intended to protect the insurer against an
insured who intentionally underinsures and then tries to get more coverage for his money than he is really entitled to. The valued policy, on
the other hand, protects the insured against an insurer that permits him
to overinsure the property, but then wants to pay less than the policy
amount. Either type of coverage provision may, depending upon the
circumstances, be violative of the fundamental insurance principle of
indemnity, which dictates that a loss should be reimbursed at its actual
value, neither more nor less.
An "open" or "unvalued" policy does not fix in advance the amount
of recovery available in the event of a loss, but leaves the matter to
be determined by a formula such as "actual cash value at the time of
loss." A "valued" policy eliminates such valuations by fixing in advance
the recovery available in the case of total destruction.
There had always been something of a fifth column within Louisiana
Revised Statutes 22:695(E). That subsection limited the recovery of the
insured, even under a valued policy and in the case of total destruction,
to the "insurable interest" of the insured in the property. Thus, the
insurer was able to argue, in a given case, that he should not be
compelled to pay the full value dictated by other portions of the statute.
If the insurer could show that such a payment would be greater than

55.

1988 La. Acts No. 951.
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the insured's insurable interest in the property, the insurer could then
56
limit its payment to the lesser amount.
The repeal of section 695 is an interesting turn of events, accomplished with very little fanfare. In theory, it is pro-insurer legislation,
arguably enabling an insurer to return to open or unvalued policies and
thereby to immunize itself from the complaint that it is permitting overinsurance and then paying less than the premium actually purchased. It
might also give insurers an additional weapon in the struggle against
arson-induced losses, which would not be a bad idea at all, but that
remains to be seen. Through the repeal, Louisiana joins the apparent
majority of states that have no valued policy requirement.
Right to Insurance Proceeds Under "Standard"
After Sale Without Appraisal

Mortgage Clause

During this term, an intermediate appellate court apparently resolved,
at least for its circuit, a minor dispute about what effect a mortgagee's
sale of secured property without appraisal has upon the mortgagee's
right to insurance proceeds under a "standard" mortgage clause. This
dispute was spawned in part by the earlier decision in Rushing v.
57
Dairyland Insurance Co.
In that case, the purchaser of a truck subjected it to a chattel
mortgage and then purchased collision insurance from Dairyland. The
policy contained an "open" mortgage clause, permitting the mortgagee
to recover from Dairyland in those circumstances under which the insured
could himself recover under the policy. Under such a clause, if the
insured were for some reason barred from recovery, then the mortgagee
would be barred as well, since the mortgagee's rights are wholly derivative
from those of the insured. As a result of an accident, the truck had
been declared a total loss and the owner filed suit against his collision
insurer. The chattel mortgagee seized the vehicle, had it sold without
appraisal, and then intervened in the owner's suit, seeking the insurance
proceeds. The supreme court held that the sale without appraisal extinguished the debt owed by the owner to the chattel mortgagee, and thus
that the mortgagee had no right to the insurance proceeds.

56. The subsection was added by 1964 La. Acts No. 464 probably in an effort to
overrule some appellate decisions that had undermined Lighting Fixture Supply v. Pacific
Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499, 146 So. 35 (1932). See generally Harvey v. General Guar.
Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Note, 29 La. L. Rev. 144 (1968); S.
McKenzie & A. Johnson, Insurance Law and Practice, § 334, in 15 Louisiana Civil Law
Treatise (1986).
57. 456 So. 2d 599 (La. 1984).
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Because of some difference of opinion in the lower courts prior to
Rushing, 8 it was unclear even after the supreme court's decision whether
the same rule would apply if the mortgage clause were "standard" or
"union" rather than "open." The decision this term in FederalNational
Mortgage v. PrudentialProperty9 answered that question in the affir-

mative.
The insurer in the Federal National Mortgage case issued a policy
that contained a standard mortgage clause, which insures the rights of
the mortgagee on a basis independent of the rights of the insured. The
mortgagee later seized the mortgaged property and eventually sold it
without appraisal, thereby cutting off its right to a deficiency judgment
and rendering the debt "fully satisfied and discharged insofar as it
constitute[d] a personal obligation of the debtor."0 After the seizure
but before the sale the property was damaged by fire, and the mortgagee
sued the insurer for the proceeds of the policy. When the owners
intervened, the insurer deposited the proceeds with the court, admitting
that either the mortgagee or the owners were entitled to them.
The mortgagee argued that the result in Rushing should not obtain
when the mortgage clause was the standard type, that is, when the

clause granted rights to the mortgagee that were independent of the
rights of the mortgagor. The appellate court did not disagree with the
contention that the mortgagee had independent rights. However, it reasoned that any action of the mortgagee, including seizure and sale
without appraisal, that extinguishes the debt, and with it the accessory
obligation of mortgage, could effectively defeat those independent rights.
The court thus extended the Rushing rule to cases involving mortgagees
that are insured under standard or union clauses.

58. Compare American Bank & Trust Co. v. Byron, 347 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 351 So. 2d 155 (1977) with Powell v. Motors Ins. Corp., 235 So. 2d
593 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
59. 517 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
60. La. R.S. 13:4106 (1968).

